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PREVIEW—United States v. Cooley:
What Will Happen to the Thinnest Blue Line?
Jo J. Phippin*
The Supreme Court of the United States will hear oral arguments
in this matter on Tuesday, March 23, 2021, telephonically, at 10 a.m.
Solicitor General Jeffrey B. Wall will likely argue for the United States.
Eric R. Henkel will likely argue for James Cooley.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents the narrow issue of whether a tribal police
officer has the authority to investigate and detain a non-Indian on a public
right-of-way within a reservation for a suspected violation of state or
federal law. The lower courts, holding that tribes have no such authority,
granted James Cooley’s (“Cooley”) motion to suppress evidence. While
the issue before the Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”)
is itself narrow, it has broad implications. Most notably, this issue greatly
impacts tribal officers’ safety, as well as the safety of all people who live
on, and pass through, reservations. The Supreme Court’s decision in this
case may affect a tribe’s ability to protect those within its territory and
clarify the contours of tribal sovereignty.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Crow Reservation spans roughly 2.3 million acres in
Montana.1 A segment of United States Highway 212 (“U.S. 212”), a public
right-of-way, crosses the Crow Reservation.2 At approximately one
o’clock in the morning on February 26, 2016, Office James Saylor
(“Officer Saylor”), of the Crow Tribe Police Department, noticed a truck
parked on the westbound shoulder of this segment of U.S. 212 with its
engine running.3 Officer Saylor decided to approach the truck because, in
his experience, drivers in this area often need assistance due to unreliable
cellular service.4 Officer Saylor saw both guns and a child in the cab of the
truck, and noted that the driver, Cooley, “appeared to be non-Indian.”5
Officer Saylor’s suspicions became aroused in the course of his interaction
with Cooley due to his “watery, blood-shot eyes,” his demeanor, and his
seemingly improbable reasoning for being on the road at that time.6
* Jo J. Phippin, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, Alexander Blewett III School
of Law at the University of Montana.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 548 (1981).
Pet’r’s Br. at 12, Jan. 8, 2021, No. 19-1414.
Pet’r’s Br. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
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What began as a welfare check ripened into a seizure when Officer
Saylor, concerned for his and the child’s safety, drew his service weapon
and held it at his side.7 Eventually, Officer Saylor placed Cooley and the
child in his patrol vehicle.8 Subsequently, Officer Saylor radioed for
backup from both county police and tribal police; while waiting, Officer
Saylor returned to the truck to cut the ignition and secure the guns.9 In
doing so, he saw in plain view what appeared to be methamphetamine and
related paraphernalia.10 After Cooley’s arrest by the county officer, an
additional search of the truck produced more methamphetamine.11
Cooley was charged in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana with one count of possessing methamphetamine with
intent to distribute and one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of
a drug-trafficking crime.12 He moved to suppress the evidence resulting
from his interaction with Officer Saylor, arguing that the seizure violated
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”).13 The District Court granted
Cooley’s motion to suppress.14 The United States appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”) where a three-judge panel
affirmed the District Court’s order and remanded the case.15 Following the
Ninth Circuit’s denial of the federal government’s petition for a rehearing
en banc,16 the United States successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari.17
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is the United States’ (“Petitioner”) position that tribes retain
inherent sovereign authority to exercise limited police powers over nonIndians on public rights-of-way within reservations.18 Petitioner claims
that such authority cannot be divested from the tribes unless expressly
withdrawn by a statute or treaty, or if its exercise “would be inconsistent
with the overriding interests of the National Government.”19 Further,
Petitioner states that the framework delineated by the Ninth Circuit
decision is legally unsound because it does not recognize such authority.20
7.
Id. at 6; Resp’t’s Br. at 2, 10, 22, Feb. 12, 2021, No. 10-1414.
8.
Pet’r’s Br. at 7.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. at 9.
12.
United States v. Cooley, No. CR 16-42-BLG-SPW, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17276, at *1 (D. Mont. Feb 19, 2020).
13.
Id.; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304 (2020).
14.
Cooley, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17276 at *13.
15.
United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1148 (9th Cir. 2019).
16.
United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 2020).
17.
United States v. Cooley, No. 19-1414, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5621
(Nov. 20, 2020); see also United States v. Cooley, SCOTUSBLOG (last visited Feb.
19, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/united-states-v-cooley/.
18.
Pet’r’s Br. at 17–31.
19.
Id. at 19.
20.
Id. at 14–15.
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Petitioner also highlights that the decision creates serious concerns
regarding safety and practicality.21 Thus, Petitioner maintains that the
Crow Tribe’s inherent sovereign authority authorized Officer Saylor’s
encounter with Cooley, and that the encounter was reasonable under 25
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2), ICRA’s Fourth Amendment parallel.22 Therefore,
Petitioner suggests the Ninth Circuit’s decision to affirm the suppression
of evidence should be vacated.23
It is Cooley’s (“Respondent”) position that inherent tribal
sovereign authority is restricted such that tribes cannot exercise limited
police powers over non-Indians on public rights-of-way within
reservations.24 Respondent claims, “[w]here nonmembers are concerned,
the ‘exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation.’”25 Further, Respondent states that any practical
concerns are matters for Congress.26 Thus, because a tribal police officer
investigated and detained Cooley, a non-Indian, for a possible violation of
state or federal law, Respondent maintains that the encounter exceeded the
Crow Tribe’s self-government authority.27 Therefore, Respondent asserts
Officer Saylor violated ICRA’s Fourth Amendment parallel, and suggests
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to affirm the suppression of evidence should
be upheld.28
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
1. Tribes Can Investigate and Detain Non-Indians
on Public Rights-of-Ways Within Reservations
Petitioner argues that tribes possess inherent sovereign authority
to exercise limited police power over non-Indians within reservations,
including on public rights-of-way. Petitioner asserts three claims in
support of this argument: first, the tribes’ status as domestic dependent
sovereigns does not divest this authority; second, Supreme Court
precedents preserve this authority; and third, historical practice confirms
this authority.
First, Petitioner asserts that a “fundamental attribute” of
sovereignty is the power to protect the people and property within a
sovereign’s territory.29 That power, Petitioner states, includes a
21.
Id. at 31–47.
22.
Id. at 14–15, 31.
23.
Id. at 16, 58.
24.
Resp’t’s Br. at 13–25.
25.
Id. at 13, 28 (citing Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001)
(quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
26.
Resp’t’s Br. at 25–30.
27.
Id. at 36–39.
28.
Id. at 13, 38, 40.
29.
Pet’r’s Br. at 16, 18 (referencing Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S.
473, 480 (1905)).
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sovereign’s undisputed authority to reasonably detain and investigate
suspects, including suspects who may have violated laws of another
sovereign.30 Further, because tribes were once independent sovereigns,31
Petitioner states that such authority cannot be divested from tribes unless
it is “‘withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a result of their
dependent status,’”32 neither of which has occurred.33
Accordingly, Petitioner claims that the tribes’ status as dependent
sovereigns does not “implicitly” divest the limited authority to investigate
and detain.34 Instead, relying on Colville, Petitioner asserts divestiture only
occurs when “‘the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent
with the overriding interests of the National Government.’”35 Petitioner
asserts that a tribes’ limited authority to investigate and detain non-Indians
within their territory “for suspected federal—and state—law violations
furthers ‘the overriding interests of the National Government,’” and thus
is retained,36 so long as such authority is exercised reasonably under
ICRA.37
Further, Petitioner asserts that certain federal statutes recognize,
rather than withdraw, this authority.38 Petitioner points to 18 U.S.C. §
1151(a), which defines Indian country as “all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government
. . . including rights-of-way running through the reservation.”39 Petitioner
suggests this definition demonstrates Congress’s “specific contemplation”
and recognition of tribal authority to exercise limited police powers over
non-Indians on public rights-of-way within reservations.40
Second, Petitioner asserts that Supreme Court precedents preserve
the tribes’ inherent sovereign authority to reasonably investigate and
detain non-Indians within reservations, including on public rights-ofway.41 Petitioner acknowledges that non-Indians are generally not subject

30.
Pet’r’s Br. at 18 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 447
(2012)); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948)); Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958); United States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 116, 118 (1st Cir. 1990).
31.
Pet’r’s Br. at 17 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
322–23 (1978)); see also United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1962 (Indian Tribes
as “separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution”); Worcester v. Georgia, 21 U.S.
515, 559 (describing Indian Tribes as “distinct, independent political communities”).
32.
Pet’r’s Br. at 19 (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323).
33.
Pet’r’s Br. at 17, 19.
34.
Id. at 17–22 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980)) [hereinafter Colville].
35.
Pet’r’s Br. at 19 (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 153).
36.
Id.; see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
37.
Pet’r’s Br. at 21 (ICRA secures the United States’ interest in
ensuring tribal officers investigate and detain non-Indians reasonably via its Fourth
Amendment parallel) (emphasis added by Petitioner).
38.
Id. at 20–21; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1152; United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004).
39.
18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2020).
40.
Pet’r’s Br. at 21.
41.
Id. at 22–26.
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to prosecution under tribal law.42 However, Petitioner asserts that the
Supreme Court has been “careful to exempt” tribes’ limited police powers
from the restrictions placed on the tribes’ adjudicatory and jurisdictional
authority because, whereas the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a
suspect subjects that person to the adjudicatory power of a tribe,
reasonable investigation and detainment do not.43 To support the assertion
that a tribes’ limited police powers are divorced from a tribes’ restricted
adjudicatory and jurisdictional authority, Petitioner points to Duro v.
Reina, in which the Supreme Court stated, “‘[w]here jurisdiction to try and
punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their
power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper authorities.’”44
Also, Petitioner asserts that the Supreme Court has “explicitly
recognized” the tribes’ inherent sovereign authority to investigate and
detain non-Indians within a reservation.45 Petitioner points to Strate v. A1 Contractors, where the Supreme Court held that a tribe could not
adjudicate a civil tort dispute arising out of an accident between two nonIndians on a public right-of-way within a reservation.46 However,
Petitioner asserts that the Supreme Court exempted the tribes’ limited
police powers from this decision when it stated, “‘[w]e do not here
question the authority of tribal police to patrol roads within a reservation,
including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, and to detain and
turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway for conduct
violating state law.’”47 The Supreme Court accompanied that statement
with a citation to State v. Schmuck, in which the Supreme Court of
Washington held that tribal officers had “‘inherent authority to stop and
detain a non-Indian who has allegedly violated state and tribal law while
on the reservation until he or she can be turned over to state authorities.’”48
Petitioner asserts the Supreme Court’s “approving” citation to Schmuck,
combined with its declination to question tribes’ police powers in Strate,
demonstrates its recognition that tribes retain inherent sovereign authority
to reasonably investigate and detain non-Indians within reservations.49
Further, Petitioner asserts that under Montana v. United States, the
Supreme Court recognized an exception where “‘a tribe may exercise
“civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within the
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
42.
Id. at 3 (citing United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1960 n.4
(2016)); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
43.
Pet’r’s Br. at 22 (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990)).
44.
Pet’r’s Br. at 22 (citing Duro, 495 U.S. at 697).
45.
Pet’r’s Br. at 22–23 (relying on Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438 (1997)).
46.
Pet’r’s Br. at 23.
47.
Id. (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 n.11); see also Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 651 (2001).
48.
Pet’r’s Br. at 23–24 (quoting State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332,
1342 (1993)).
49.
Pet’r’s Br. at 23.
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tribe.”’”50 Petitioner claims the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this
exception “reflects a general principle” that tribes have the ability to
protect against “imminent danger,” which may include investigating and
detaining non-Indians suspected of violating state or federal law.51
Finally, Petitioner asserts that historical practice confirms the
tribes’ inherent sovereign authority to reasonably investigate and detain
non-Indians within reservations, including on public rights-of-way.52
Petitioner points to the fact that various treaties required tribes to “deliver
up” non-Indian suspects from reservations to United States authorities to
be prosecuted.53 Similarly, Petitioner points to the “bad men” provisions
found in some treaties, including the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Crow Tribe of Indians (“Crow Treaty”),54 and asserts that
the “bad men among the whites” language refers to non-Indians.55
Petitioner asserts that in order to meet these requirements, it is necessary
for tribes to investigate and detain non-Indian suspects.56 Further,
Petitioner asserts that because such treaties did not expressly grant tribes
the power to do so, tribes derived the power from their retained inherent
sovereignty.57
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Should Be Vacated
Petitioner asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s decision delineated a
novel framework to assess tribal officers’ interactions with non-Indian
suspects on public rights-of-ways within reservations.58 Under this
framework, tribal officers may only stop vehicles suspected of violating
tribal laws, inquire about the driver’s Indian status (typically one

50.
Id. at 25 (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land &
Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 329–30 (2008) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.,
544, 566 (1981)).
51.
Pet’r’s Br. at 25–26 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566) (stating
drunk driving and the transport of contraband within reservations seriously threatens
“the health or welfare of the tribe”).
52.
Pet’r’s Br. at 26–31.
53.
Id. at 26; see also Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The
Federal Courts’ Frustration of Tribal-Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7–8
(2004); Eileen Luna-Firebaugh, Tribal Policing: Asserting Sovereignty, SEEKING
JUSTICE 17 (2007).
54.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Crow Tribe
of Indians, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.
55.
Pet’r’s Br. at 29; see also Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568
(1883) (interpreting the phrase “bad men among the whites” from the Crow Treaty to
mean “whites and their allies”).
56.
Pet’r’s Br. at 29.
57.
Id. at 26–27 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327
n.24 (1978)) (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)) (referring
to treaties between the United States and Indian Tribes as “not a grant of rights to the
Indians, but a grant of rights from them”); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
58.
Pet’r’s Br. at 15, 33.
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question),59 and may only detain a non-Indian driver if an “‘apparent’ or
‘obvious’” state or federal crime was witnessed during such an
encounter.60 Petitioner argues that because the Ninth Circuit failed to
acknowledge tribes’ inherent sovereign authority to exercise limited police
powers over non-Indian suspects within reservations, it delineated this
novel framework instead of evaluating the facts of this case under the
correct Fourth Amendment standard, made applicable to the tribes via
ICRA’s Fourth Amendment parallel.61 Petitioner supports this argument
with three assertions: first, the Ninth Circuit’s framework has no legal
basis; second, the framework is practically unworkable; and third, it
creates safety concerns.62
First, Petitioner asserts the Ninth Circuit’s framework has no legal
basis.63 Instead, Petitioner states that the Ninth Circuit derived key aspects
of the framework, specifically the “‘apparent’ or ‘obvious’” standard, from
dictum in a prior circuit decision.64 Further, Petitioner claims the
framework rests on the incorrect premise that tribes derive their police
authority from only two sources: the ability to enforce criminal laws
against Indians within a reservation and the ability to exclude non-Indians
from a reservation.65 Petitioner claims this conclusion is incorrect based
on the preceding argument that tribes retain inherent authority to exercise
limited police powers over non-Indians.66
Additionally, Petitioner asserts, because the Crow Tribe possesses
the inherent sovereign authority to investigate and detain non-Indians
within the Crow Reservation, such authority is subject to congressional
control and is not ripe for “judicial lawmaking,” as with other inherent
powers retained by tribes.67 Thus, Petitioner argues that tribal officers
should operate under the standard set forth by Congress in ICRA as
opposed to a framework constructed by the Ninth Circuit.68 Petitioner
states courts have interpreted ICRA § 1302(a)(2) “in pari materia” with
the Fourth Amendment.69 Although tribes’ authority to arrest non-Indian
59.
United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citing United States v. Patch, 114 F.3d 131, 134 (9th Cir. 1997)).
60.
Cooley, 919 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891,
896–97 (9th Cir. 2009)).
61.
Pet’r’s Br. at 31 (referencing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2)).
62.
Pet’r’s Br. at 31, 35.
63.
Id. at 31–35.
64.
Id. at 33 (quoting Bressi, 575 F.3d at 895–97).
65.
Pet’r’s Br. at 31–32 (citing United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135,
1141–42 (9th Cir. 2019)).
66.
Pet’r’s Br. at 32 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492, U.S. 408, 425 (1989)).
67.
Pet’r’s Br. at 33 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
327 (1978)).
68.
Pet’r’s Br. at 33–34 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 195 n.6 (1978)).
69.
Pet’r’s Br. at 34; see also United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869,
872 (8th Cir. 1981); State v. Railey, 532 P.2d 205, 206 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); State v.
Madsen, 760 N.W.2d 370, 376 (S.D. 2009); Clark v. Fort Peck Tribes, 15 AM. TRIBAL
LAW 203, 205 (Fort Peck Ct. App. 2018).
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suspects allows detainment only for the purpose of transferring custody to
state or federal law enforcement, detainment of a non-Indian based on
reasonable suspicion or probable cause remains reasonable so long as the
conditions and length are not excessive.70 Thus, Petitioner argues that the
Ninth Circuit’s requirement that a tribal officer must witness an
“‘apparent’ or ‘obvious’” violation of state or federal law before detaining
a non-Indian is a standard higher than what the Fourth Amendment and
ICRA require, and is therefore incorrect.71
Second, Petitioner asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s framework is
practically unworkable.72 Petitioner states that the framework
inappropriately precludes several types of investigatory stops because it
exempts any suspect who violates a law other than tribal law, as well as
any suspects known to tribal officers to be non-Indians.73 Petitioner asserts
that the result is public rights-of-way, as well as non-Indian land, within
reservations become a “safe haven” for suspects.74 To compound this
problem, Petitioner points to the fact that many reservations have alienated
sizeable acreage to non-Indians, creating a checkerboard effect such that
tribal officers may be unsure of who owns the land they are on at any given
time.75 Thus, Petitioner predicts that the framework will create a chilling
effect on tribal policing.76
Next, Petitioner asserts the framework inappropriately restricts
both investigatory stops and detentions.77 Petitioner states that by
restricting a tribal officer’s initial authority during an encounter to
determine a suspect’s Indian status through one question, the framework
requires a tribal officer to let a suspect go if they are non-Indian or their
status is unascertainable.78 Petitioner emphasizes that this provides
motivation to lie about one’s status.79 Further, Petitioner asserts that the
heightened standard of “‘apparent’ or ‘obvious’” restricts investigation

70.
Pet’r’s Br. at 34–35 (citing Duro, 496 U.S. at 697); see also Heien
v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2).
71.
Pet’r’s Br. at 34–35 (quoting Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 896–
897 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir.
2020).
72.
Pet’r’s Br. at 35.
73.
Id. at 36.
74.
Id. at 37 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454
(1997) ( “alienated, non-Indian land” is land within a reservation owned in fee by nonIndians, and such alienated lands are jurisdictionally equivalent to public rights-ofway)).
75.
Pet’r’s Br.at 38; see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
548 (1981) (approximately 30% of the 2.3 million acres of the Crow Reservation is
owned in fee by non-Indians).
76.
Pet’r’s Br. at 39.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 40 (citing United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d 1215, 1230 (9th
Cir. 2020) (Collins, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)).
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and detention in situations that would easily comport with Fourth
Amendment and ICRA standards.80
Finally, Petitioner asserts that several safety concerns are borne
out of the framework.81 Petitioner points to the fact that reservations have
high crime rates, and the framework “threatens to make the situation
worse” by curtailing tribal officers’ limited police powers over nonIndians.82 Petitioner asserts this curtailment creates a law enforcement
vacuum that other sovereigns “cannot be expected to fill.”83 Petitioner
states that cross-deputization is not an appropriate remedy to any of the
preceding issues, as Respondent suggests.84 Thus, Petitioner claims,
because of the restrictions created by the framework, as well as its
potential chilling effect, the safety of tribal officers, reservation residents,
and passers through alike are placed in peril.85
B. Respondent’s Arguments
1. Tribes Cannot Investigate Nor Detain Non-Indians
on Public Rights-of-Way Within Reservations
Respondent argues that tribes do not possess inherent sovereign
authority to investigate and detain non-Indians on public rights-of-way
within reservations.86 Respondent makes three assertions in support of this
argument: first, tribes are divested of inherent sovereign authority to
exercise police power over non-Indians; second, Supreme Court
precedents support this restriction; and third, the “bad men” provision in
the Crow Treaty does not recognize nor create such authority.87
First, Respondent suggests that incorporation divested the tribes’
of their inherent sovereign authority to exercise police power over nonIndians.88 Respondent claims Petitioner’s assertion that a sovereign has
“undisputed” authority to reasonably detain and investigate suspects who
may have violated laws of another sovereign is incorrect.89 Respondent
suggests Petitioner’s argument overlooks the “fundamental principle” of
Indian law that tribes are not “full territorial sovereigns.”90 Thus,
80.
Pet’r’s Br. at 41–42 (referencing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)).
81.
Pet’r’s Br. at 44.
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 45.
84.
Id. at 47; see also Res’p’s Br. at 28–30; Cooley, 947 F.3d at 1237
(Collins, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
85.
Pet’r’s Br. at 42–43.
86.
Resp’t’s Br. at 13–21.
87.
Id. at 13–25, 30–36.
88.
Id. at 10 (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land &
Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008)); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978).
89.
Resp’t’s Br. at 17–18 (also asserting this matter is disputed in the
lower courts and that case law relied on by the Petitioner is unpersuasive).
90.
Id. (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle
Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008)).
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Respondent asserts that because tribes’ sovereignty is limited, they have
no retained authority over non-Indians within reservations, particularly on
land which is not owned by a tribe, such as a public right-of-way.91
Additionally, although investigating and detaining non-Indian
suspects may “further the interests of the United States,” Respondent
claims tribes do not retain such police power.92 Respondent argues
Petitioner’s reliance on Colville to claim that tribes retain inherent
sovereignty absent divestiture is “self-defeating.”93 To support this
argument, Respondent states that an inherent police power exercised by
tribes to enforce federal law “contravenes the founders’ rejection of a
federal police power.”94 Also, Respondent asserts that Colville is factually
distinct from the case at bar.95
Next, Respondent addresses the dissent in Bourland v. South
Dakota,96 which, citing Colville, stated “[t]his Court has found implicit
divestiture of inherent sovereignty necessary only ‘where the exercise of
tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of
the National Government[.]’”97 Respondent underscores that the majority
in Bourland stated, under Montana, “‘tribal sovereignty over nonmembers
‘cannot survive without express congressional delegation’ and is therefore
not inherent.’”98 Finally, Respondent claims that neither ICRA nor the
definition of Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 is such a
congressional delegation.99
Second, Respondent argues that Supreme Court precedents
restrict, rather than preserve, the tribes’ inherent sovereign authority to
investigate and detain non-Indians.100 Respondent asserts that under
Oliphant, the Supreme Court restricted the tribes’ inherent sovereign
authority to matters of self-government, “‘absent affirmative delegation of
such power by Congress,’” because of the United States’ overriding
interest in protecting their citizens from “‘unwarranted intrusions on their

91.
Resp’t’s Br. at 17–18.
92.
Id. at 11; Pet’r’s Br. at 13.
93.
Resp’t’s Br. at 20 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153–54 (1980)).
94.
Resp’t’s Br. at 19 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 698,
618–19 (2000)); see also United States v. Lopez, 515 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
95.
Resp’t’s Br. at 19 (citing Colville, 447 U.S. at 144) (explaining
Colville concerned tribal taxation authority over non-Indians on tribal land engaging
in commerce with the tribe, while this case concerns criminal jurisdiction over a nonIndian on a public right-of-way).
96.
Resp’t’s Br. at 20 (citing South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679,
695 n.15 (1993)).
97.
Resp’t’s Br. at 20 (quoting Bourland, 508 U.S. at 699) (citing
Colville, 447 U.S. at 153–154)).
98.
Resp’t’s Br. at 20 (citing Bourland, 508 U.S. at 695) (quoting
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
99.
Resp’t’s Br. at 23–24 (citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645, 653 n.5 (2001)).
100.
Resp’t’s Br. at 13–18.
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personal liberty.’”101 This restriction is further evidenced by Wheeler,
which Respondent claims reiterates the divestiture of the tribes’ inherent
sovereign authority over interactions between Indians and non-Indians.102
Finally, Respondent asserts that under Montana, the Supreme Court,
applying Oliphant and Wheeler, held a tribes’ retained “‘powers of selfgovernment, including the power to prescribe and enforce internal
criminal laws’ did not” apply to non-Indians.103 Thus, Respondent argues
“‘the inherent authority of the tribes [regarding criminal law] has been
preserved’” only over members, not non-Indians.104
Relatedly, Respondent argues that the tribes’ police power over
non-Indians cannot be divorced from the tribes’ adjudicative or legislative
power.105 Respondent points to the Supreme Court’s statement in Duro
that the tribes’ “‘retained sovereignty does not extend to non-Indians in
the area of criminal enforcement.’”106 Respondent also points to the
Supreme Court’s statement in Strate: “‘[a]s to non-members, we hold a
tribe’s [civil] adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction.’”107 Further, Respondent asserts that, under Strate, tribes have
no power to exclude non-Indians from non-Indian land, which includes
public rights-of-way.108 Thus, Respondent claims that Strate not only does
not recognize the tribes’ inherent sovereign authority to exercise police
powers over non-Indians as Petitioner suggests, but that it further restricts
such authority.109 Additionally, Respondent asserts that the Supreme
Court’s declination to question the tribes’ authority to police rights-of-way
within reservations is unpersuasive dictum.110 Further, Respondent
suggests the Supreme Court’s citation to Schmuck does not amount to a
recognition of the tribes’ inherent authority to exercise police powers over
non-Indians; rather, Respondent suggests Schmuck simply supports the
notion that tribes’ inherent authority is based only on enforcing tribal
law.111

101.
Id. at 11 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
210 (1978)); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990).
102.
Resp’t’s Br. at 16 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
326 (1978)).
103.
Resp’t’s Br. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 547).
104.
Resp’t’s Br. (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 378) (Souter,
J., concurring)).
105.
Resp’t’s Br. at 21–22 (citing United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,
227 n.1 (2004)).
106.
Resp’t’s Br. at 21–22 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 557 (1975).
107.
Resp’t’s Br. at 21 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
454 (1997)).
108.
Resp’t’s Br. at 15 (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 438, 454).
109.
Resp’t’s Br. at 22 (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 465); see also Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 327–28 (2008).
110.
Resp’t’s Br. at 23 (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 n.11).
111.
Resp’t’s Br. (citing State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Wash.
1993)).
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Next, Respondent asserts that Petitioner “inappropriately
expand[s]” the Montana exception.112 Respondent suggests that the
exception triggers only when conduct by a non-Indian on tribal land
threatens the tribe; “[t]he conduct must do more than injure the tribe, it
must ‘imperil the subsistence’ of the tribal community.”113 Respondent
asserts that “Cooley’s presence in a vehicle pulled over on a right-of-way”
does not trigger this exception.114
Third, Respondent argues that the “bad men” provision in the
Crow Treaty does not recognize, nor create in the Crow Tribe, a limited
police power over non-Indians. First, Respondent suggests the Supreme
Court should not consider this argument as Petitioner failed to raise it in
the lower courts.115 Alternatively, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s
interpretation of the provision is too broad, and instead, the provision
creates a narrow private right of action for damages to individual
Indians.116
2. Congress Is the Appropriate Body to Remedy Practical Concerns
Respondent argues that Congress is the appropriate body to
remedy concerns on reservations related to practicality or safety, such as
jurisdictional voids in law enforcement.117 In support of this argument,
Respondent asserts that the Supreme Court has honored the “‘fundamental
commitment of Indian law [which] is judicial respect for Congress’s
primary role in defining the contours of tribal sovereignty.’”118
Respondent points to Oliphant and Duro as “impenetrable” stare
decisis.119
Next, Respondent asserts that Congress addressed jurisdictional
voids when it gave the executive branch the authority to cross-deputize
tribal officers, thus “empower[ing] tribes to investigate crime and enforce
federal law in Indian country.”120 In fact, Respondent states that crossdeputization appropriately addresses a remedy for the facts presented here.
112.
Resp’t’s Br. at 24.
113.
Id. at 25 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)
(quoting Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 341)).
114.
Resp’t’s Br. at 25.
115.
Id. at 31 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)
(stating “[i]t is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not
consider an issue not passed upon below”).
116.
Resp’t’s Br. at 31–34.
117.
Id. at 25–30.
118.
Id. at 27 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S.
782, 803 (2014)).
119.
Resp’t’s Br. at 26–27 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978)) (stating jurisdictional voids “have little relevance to the
principles which lead us to conclude that Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction
to try and punish non-Indians…these are considerations for Congress to weigh[.]”));
see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698 (1990).
120.
Resp’t’s Br. at 28–29; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 2803–2805; 25 C.F.R. §
12.21; 25 U.S.C. § 878(a)(3)).
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Thus, Respondent claims a judicial finding of inherent authority is
unjustified just because of “the reality that relevant officials did not avail
themselves of cross-deputization.”121
IV. ANALYSIS
The issue presented in this case is whether Officer Saylor
exceeded the bounds of the Crow Tribes’ authority when he seized Cooley
and detained him until he transferred custody to state law enforcement.122
Thus, the decision requires the Supreme Court to squarely address the
bounds of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservations.
There are several topics that may inform the Supreme Court’s decision,
including, but not limited to, Congress’s role, concerns regarding
practicality and safety, and the Crow Treaty itself.
A. Congress’s Role
The Supreme Court will likely address the disagreement between
the parties regarding divestiture and congressional intent. Petitioner argues
that only Congress can regulate or divest the tribes of inherent sovereign
authority, such as the limited power to investigate and detain.123
Accordingly, Petitioner asserts that Congress has acted via ICRA, and
thus, tribal police should operate under ICRA’s reasonable standard.124
However, Respondent argues that incorporation divested the tribes of such
authority, and that “tribal sovereignty over nonmembers ‘cannot survive
without express congressional delegation’ and is therefore not
inherent.”125 Further, Respondent asserts that Congress did not intend to
delegate such authority to the tribes via ICRA.126
In addressing this disagreement, the Supreme Court will likely
look to the Members of Congress Amicus Brief. There, amici curiae assert
that tribal sovereignty may only be divested by express congressional
intent.127 Further, they assert congressional intent clearly allows tribes to
investigate and detain non-Indian suspects in Indian country because of
ICRA’s enactment and the inclusion of a Fourth Amendment parallel.128
Thus, this brief suggests that the Supreme Court should vacate the Ninth
Circuit’s decision, which bolsters Petitioner’s position.129

121.
Resp’t’s Br. at 28.
122.
United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1139–41 (9th Cir. 2019).
123.
Pet’r’s Br. at 13, 17–18.
124.
Id. at 33–34.
125.
Resp’t’s Br. at 20 (quoting South Dakota v. Bouralnd, 508 U.S.
679, 695 n.15 (1993) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)
(emphasis in original)).
126.
Resp’t’s Br. at 36–37.
127.
Members of Cong. Amicus Br. at 2–3, 4–7, Jan. 15, 2021, No 191414.
128.
Id. at 3, 8–12; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2).
129.
Members of Cong. Amicus Br. at 2.
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B. Concerns About Practicality and Safety
The Supreme Court, in reaching its decision, will also likely
address concerns regarding practicality and safety. Respondent argues that
Congress has already appropriately acted to assuage concerns by allowing
for cross-deputization of tribal officers.130 However, Petitioner asserts that
the Ninth Circuit’s decision threatens the safety of tribal officers, as well
as anyone within a reservation, and that cross-deputization is not an
appropriate remedy.131 Further, Petitioner highlights that the Ninth
Circuit’s decision precludes tribal officers from making investigatory
stops, which are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.132 In the
Members of Congress Amicus Brief, amici curiae assert that Congress has
an interest, and is currently engaged in efforts, to enhance public safety in
Indian country. This brief suggests that tribal officers’ ability to conduct
investigatory stops of non-Indians is essential to furthering this effort.133
Further, while addressing the issue of public safety, the Supreme
Court may refer to the National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center
(“NIWRC”) Amicus Brief, which asserts that murdered and missing
indigenous women and girls is a crisis that cannot be addressed properly
unless tribal officers can perform investigatory stops of non-Indians within
reservations.134 The NIWRC amici curiae point out that “Native people
experience some of the highest rates of violent victimization in the United
States.”135 Further, non-Indians commit a majority of these crimes, and
many reservations contain vast acreage of non-Indian fee lands as well as
non-Indian residents.136 Thus, the NIWRC brief supports Petitioner’s

130.
Resp’t’s Br. at 12, 25–28.
131.
Pet’r’s Br. at 13, 44–48; see also National Congress of American
Indians, Tribal Nations and Inter-Tribal Organizations (“NCAI”) Amicus Br. at 10,
Jan. 15, 2021, No. 19–1414 (stating the Ninth Circuit’s ruling “severely impedes”
tribes’ authority to provide for public safety in Indian country).
132.
Pet’r’s Br. at 15–16 (stating that under the Ninth Circuit’s standard,
“[a] tribal officer would be precluded from investigating further if, during an
interaction with a non-Indian motorist, he smelled alcohol on the motorist’s breath or
a drug-detecting dog alerted, the motorist matched the description of the subject of a
widely broadcast law-enforcement lookout bulletin, or even (as in this case) the
motorist’s actions appeared to threaten the officer’s own safety”); see also NCAI Br.
at 11–14 (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling handicaps tribal officers ability to
protect themselves and others by contradicting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
133.
Members of Cong. Br. at 3, 12–27; see Violence Against Women
Act (“VAWA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 13925–14045d (2020); Tribal Law and Order Act
(“TLOA”) Pub. L. No. 111–211, 124 Stat. 2258 (codified in scattered sections of 25
and 42 U.S.C. (2020).
134.
NIWRC Br. at 21–27, Jan. 15, 2021, No. 19-1414.
135.
Id. at 14 (citing André B. Rosay, Violence Against American Indian
and Alaska Native Women and Men: 2010 Findings from the National Intimate
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 44 (May 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
249736.pdf).
136.
NIWRC Br. at 8, 14–15, 16–20.
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argument that cross-deputization is not enough to remedy these principal
concerns.
C. The Crow Treaty
Finally, the Supreme Court may address the Crow Treaty. Its
relevant recent precedent, McGirt v. Oklahoma and Herrera v. Wyoming,
shows it is both open to treaty interpretation and interested in upholding
the United States’ treaty promises to the tribes.137 Still, the Supreme Court
may not reach the treaty issue because, as Respondent underscores, the
lower courts did not consider it.138 Generally, a federal appellate court will
not consider such an issue.139 However, the Supreme Court’s recent
emphasis on upholding treaty promises to the tribes may entice it to forego
the general rule and address the issue. But, unlike the case at bar, both
McGirt and Herrera raised relevant treaty issues in the respective lower
courts.140
If the Supreme Court does address the Crow Treaty, its decision
will likely turn on its interpretation of the “bad men” provision. Petitioner
asserts that treaties, along with the historical interpretations of “bad men,”
confirm tribal authority to investigate and detain non-Indians within
reservations.141 Respondent disagrees with Petitioner’s interpretation.142
The Supreme Court may look to the National Congress of American
Indians, Tribal Nations and Inter-Tribal Organizations (“NCAI”) Brief for
guidance on interpreting the Crow Treaty. NCAI amici curiae conclude,
“Respondent could qualify as a ‘bad man’ under the [Treaty], but only
‘upon proof made’ would he be subject to arrest and punishment.”143 Thus,
the NCAI Brief supports the assertion that the Crow Treaty, based on a
plain interpretation of its text, reserves the Crow Tribe’s right to
investigative authority over non-Indians.144
Also, it is important to note that both McGirt and Herrera are split
5–4 decisions with the narrow majority consisting of Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch with Justices Roberts, Thomas,
Alito, and Kavanaugh dissenting. Further, the Supreme Court’s current
makeup is altered due to the passing of Justice Ginsburg and the addition
of Justice Barrett. Because the establishing precedents were comprised of
narrow majorities, and because Justice Ginsburg is no longer on the bench,
it is likely that the case at bar will result in another split decision. But,
137.
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020) (stating that the
Supreme Court should “hold the government to its word”); see also Herrera v.
Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1696 (2019) (stating that Congress “‘must clearly express
any intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights”) (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999)).
138.
Resp’t’s Br. at 31.
139.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).
140.
See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452; Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686.
141.
Pet’r’s Br. at 26.
142.
Resp’t’s Br. at 30.
143.
NCAI Br. at 33.
144.
Id. at 30–34.
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overall, if the Supreme Court addresses the Crow Treaty, it will likely
follow its recent trend of upholding treaty promises to the tribes, which
will probably result in a decision that is favorable to Petitioner.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision will inform whether
tribal police operate under the familiar standard of reasonableness set forth
by ICRA and the Fourth Amendment, or under the heightened “apparent”
or “obvious” standard delineated by the Ninth Circuit. Whichever side of
this issue the Court comes down on, its decision will directly affect the
safety of all those within reservations. Additionally, this decision may help
clarify the contours of tribal sovereignty.

